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MIRANDA FOR JANUS: THE GOVERNMENT’S
OBLIGATION TO ENSURE INFORMED
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Deborah J. La Fetra*
Overturning forty years of precedent, the Supreme Court held in Janus v.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138
S. Ct. 2448 (2018), that public employees have a First Amendment right to refrain
from joining or subsidizing a union because the union may use their money to speak
on a wide range of inherently political matters, including speech with which they
may disagree. Therefore, the state may deduct dues from employee paychecks and
transfer the money to the union only if employees affirmatively waive their First
Amendment rights. As a matter of constitutional due process, this means that the
choice to subsidize the union depends on employees’ knowledge that their First
Amendment rights are implicated Yet, in response to Janus, California enacted a law
that effectively stands as an obstacle to workers’ full exercise of their First Amendment rights by giving unions—not employers—the authority to inform employees
that they have a constitutional right not to join the union. This law serves as a model
for other states’ existing and proposed legislation. Workers cannot exercise a right
they do not know they have, and the state cannot abdicate its duty to ensure a knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutional rights. Both the First Amendment and due
process demand more. Modeled on the principles underlying Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), this article argues that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the government employer, prior to deducting union dues from
paychecks, to provide adequate information about workers’ First Amendment rights
such that employees are capable of making a knowing and voluntary waiver, if they
so choose.

* Senior Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation. Ms. La Fetra thanks Larry Salzman, Jim Manley, Erin Wilcox, Hannah Marcley, Tim Snowball, and Brian Hodges for their helpful comments
and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
Information is knowledge, knowledge is power, and power is
money.1
On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court held in Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME),
Council 31,2 that public employees cannot be forced to pay dues to a
union.3 The Court reasoned that collective bargaining with a government agency is inherently political because it involves tax dollars and
government budgets.4 Public employees have a First Amendment right
to avoid being forced to subsidize political speech against their will.5
“Unless employees clearly and affirmatively consent before any
money is taken from them,” deducting union dues from a nonmember’s wages violates the First Amendment.6 Prior to Janus, for more
than forty years, silence, or “doing nothing” was not enough to keep
an employee from subsidizing the union. Under this former understanding of First Amendment law, states could permit public employee
unions to impose opt-out schemes, in which the unions could impose
membership and deduct dues from employees’ paychecks without the
employees’ affirmative consent.7 But Janus now prohibits such optout schemes.8 Under the law as now understood, the key point is that
public workers have a choice: join the union or don’t; pay union dues

1. See United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 689 (1st Cir. 1987);
Duct-O-Wire Co. v. U.S. Crane, Inc., 31 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1994).
2. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
3. Id. at 2456 (“The State’s extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment.”).
4. Id. at 2473 (noting, for example, that a public employee union’s request for a raise “could
have a serious impact on the budget of the government unit in question, and by the same token,
denying a raise might have a significant effect on the performance of government services” and,
therefore, greatly enlarges the category of union speech that is of public concern).
5. Id. at 2464 (compelling people to subsidize the speech of other private speakers “coerce[s
them] into betraying their convictions”).
6. Id. at 2486 (emphasis added). The Court’s full explanation and context for this holding is:
Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless
the employee affirmatively consents to pay. By agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their First Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed. Rather, to be
effective, the waiver must be freely given and shown by “clear and compelling” evidence. Unless employees clearly and affirmatively consent before any money is taken
from them, this standard cannot be met.
Id. (citations omitted).
7. See Mitchell v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 258, 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1992) (dissent is
not presumed).
8. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
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or don’t. Workers who value the union’s services will join; those who
do not value those services will not.
However, most public workers are unaware this choice exists9
and the unions have every financial incentive to keep that information
secret.10 But what about the government employers? They cannot deduct union dues from employee wages without asking employees if
they “clearly and affirmatively consent” to the deduction.11 But can
state agencies even inform their workers that they have a constitutional
right to work without union membership or paying union dues? Not in
California.
Former California Governor Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown, Jr. signed
Senate Bill 866 (SB 866) on the day Janus was decided.12 SB 866 forbids public agencies from communicating with their employees about
union membership and dues and gives to the public employee unions
the sole responsibility for obtaining consent for dues deductions.13 The
law allows only union representatives to address new employees at
their orientation meetings and forbids public agencies from disclosing
to anyone other than the union and the new employees the time and
place of such meetings.14 California agencies may not send email or
any other “mass communication” to workers regarding union membership or dues without the union’s approval of the content or simultaneously with the union’s own mass communication (paid for by the

9. See, e.g., Hoekman v. Educ. Minn., 335 F.R.D. 219, 229 (D. Minn. 2020) (“[Plaintiff]
joined the union because, she asserts, she was not given the option to be a ‘fair share’ fee payer;
accordingly, she believed she had no choice in the matter.”). Unions have long pressured employees
to join without incurring any legal liability. See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n
of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 277–78 (1974) (union may legally post a list
of non-members and label non-members as “scabs” to persuade non-members to join).
10. See Rick Karlin, NYSUT Has Fewer Payers Post-Janus Decision, TIMES UNION (Dec. 3,
2018), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/NYSUT-has-fewer-payers-post-Janus-13439737
.php [https://perma.cc/2FJ6-W5GJ] (noting a 6 percent drop in New York’s largest union’s membership post-Janus); Jennifer Mueller, How the Janus Ruling Might Doom Public Pensions Next,
SLATE (July 18, 2018, 4:17 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/how-the-janus-rulin
g-might-doom-public-pensions-next.html [https://perma.cc/QBN8-JN6B]; see also Daniel
DiSalvo, Public-Sector Unions After Janus: An Update, MANHATTAN INST. (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/public-sector-unions-after-janus
[https://perma.cc/3CXKSK7Q] (noting financial impact of loss of agency shop fee payers and works who choose to resign
their union membership).
11. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
12. CAL. S., HISTORY OF SENATE BILL NO. 866, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB866
[https://perma.cc/8WNP-RN4M]. As “urgency” legislation, the law went into effect immediately.
13. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1157.12 (West Supp. 2018).
14. Id. § 3556.
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employer).15 These laws are intended to keep public workers ignorant
of their constitutional rights so that when the union representative
hands them a membership card and says “sign here,”16 they do so without understanding that they have a choice, much less the consequences
of that choice.
SB 866 unconstitutionally infringes upon California public employees’ due process right to receive the information necessary to give
a clear and affirmative waiver of their First Amendment rights. Because there can be no legitimate state interest (much less, an important
or compelling one) in deliberately keeping government employees ignorant of their rights, a state law that limits access to information so
that it is available only from a public employee union with no obligation to provide it (or interest in doing so) is unconstitutional. SB 866
effectively places potentially insurmountable obstacles before citizens
seeking to understand their constitutional rights. This is a wholly illegitimate purpose that should not save a statute even under rational basis review, much less the “exacting” review typically applied in First
Amendment union dues cases.17
We don’t tolerate this type of constitutional gamesmanship in
other contexts. For example, when the government forecloses on taxdelinquent property, the notice requirements of due process require the
government to act affirmatively to make it as likely as possible that
property owners are made aware that they are in danger of losing their
rights. In Jones v. Flowers,18 the Supreme Court held that when a tax
sale threatens to deprive an owner of real property, due process requires that “when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed,
the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide

15. Id. § 3553.
16. This is similar to unions’ oft-proposed but never enacted federal “card-check” legislation
to amend the National Labor Relations Act to require employers to recognize a union when the
employer is presented with evidence of majority support for union recognition via card check. See,
e.g., H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). Opponents successfully
argued that card-check organizing would “allow unions to coerce employees into unwanted union
representation, and, thus, that such a system will not protect employees who wish to exercise their
true will regarding union representation.” Rafael Gely & Timothy Chandler, Organizing Principles: The Significance of Card-Check Laws, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 475, 478 (2011) (citations omitted).
17. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 321–22 (2012); cf. Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (due process does not permit laws that
“operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion”).
18. 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
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notice to the property owner before selling his property”19 and the notice must be “such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.”20
Most famously, the Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona21
that when a police officer wants to question a criminal suspect in custody, the officer must explain that the suspect “has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”22 It doesn’t matter that the suspect may
already know his rights, or that his friends may be advising him to
keep quiet and call a lawyer.23 The state itself is obligated to inform
the suspect of his constitutional rights so that they are not waived out
of ignorance.24 The state’s act of informing the suspect of his constitutional rights is a necessary predicate to the suspect effecting a waiver
of these rights: a “clear and unequivocal” waiver that must be made
“voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.”25 Moreover, Miranda requires the state to accept invocation of a waiver at any time—even if
the suspect answers some questions, the police must cease their

19. Id. at 225 (emphasis added). When the state sells the debt to a private investor, the investor
also receives the mandate to deliver proper notice. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 932–34
(1982).
20. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950); see also Echavarria
v. Pitts, 641 F.3d 92, 94–95 (5th Cir. 2011) (“When the government has knowledge that notice was
not effected, it cannot ‘simply ignore’ that information.”). Outside of the real estate context, multiple Circuit courts rely on Jones to require additional steps after failed attempts at notice in cases
involving property interests including $1,500 in cash, personal property, denial of government applications, and revocation of licenses. See, e.g., Rodríguez v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 219 F. App’x 22,
23–24 (1st Cir. 2007) (Jones required additional notice of administrative forfeiture of $1,905); Echavarria, 641 F.3d at 95 (Jones applies to forfeiture of bondsman’s $1,500); Rendon v. Holder, 400
F. App’x 218, 219 (9th Cir. 2010) (additional reasonable steps required to notify immigrant of
denial of application for legalization); United States v. One Star Class Sloop Sailboat, 458 F.3d 16,
23 n.7, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying Jones to civil forfeiture of sailboat); Crum v. Vincent, 493 F.3d
988, 992–93 (8th Cir. 2007) (Jones applies to state’s deprivation of physician’s medical license
without due process); Yi Tu v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 470 F.3d 941, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2006)
(additional steps required to notify pilot of suspension of his pilot’s license).
21. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22. Id. at 444. This “constitutional decision” cannot be overruled by an act of Congress or any
state law. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432, 438 (2000).
23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 (“[T]he expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.”).
24. Id. (“For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware
of it—the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.”).
25. Id. at 444, 467–68.
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interrogation immediately once the suspect invokes his right to remain
silent or to ask for a lawyer.26
Before making deductions from employee paychecks to transfer
to public employee unions, the state has a constitutional duty to ensure
that each individual employee clearly and affirmatively waived his or
her First Amendment right to refrain from joining or financially supporting the unions.27 In this Article, I propose that this duty requires
government employers to adopt a Miranda-style rule of mandatory
disclosure to ensure that government employees have sufficient information to choose whether to waive their First Amendment rights. Part
I describes the Janus ruling and the California legislation enacted to
blunt its impact. Part II explores the contours of the due process requirement of informed, affirmative consent and what this means in the
context of waiving constitutional rights. Part III proposes Mirandafor-Janus, a neutral explanation of public employees’ First Amendment rights that is a necessary First Amendment corollary to the need
to provide informed, affirmative consent to waive those rights. Part IV
addresses the intersection of constitutional waiver rights and contract
law, particularly related to the existence of a collective bargaining
agreement that, by its terms, presumes a waiver rather than seeking
affirmative consent. Finally, Part V proposes language that public employers may use to ensure that all employees have adequate information to choose whether to “clearly and affirmatively” waive their
First Amendment rights.
I. JANUS’S NEW HOPE AND THE CALIFORNIA UNIONS STRIKE BACK
A. The Janus Decision
On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court held in Janus v. AFSCME
Council 31,28 that the government cannot require public employees to
pay union dues or agency shop fees (mandatory union service fees paid
by non-members) without the employees “clearly and affirmatively”
waiving their First Amendment right to refrain from supporting the
union. Janus overturned an Illinois statute that authorized public employee unions to deduct money from workers’ paychecks regardless
of whether those employees were members of the union or consented
26. Id. at 437–74.
27. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2248, 2486
(2018).
28. Id. at 2486.
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to the deduction.29 The Court quoted Thomas Jefferson’s powerful exhortation that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful
and tyrannical”30 and recognized that compelling individuals to subsidize the speech of private organizations like unions “seriously impinges” their First Amendment rights and “cannot be casually allowed.”31 Therefore, the government must demonstrate by “clear and
compelling evidence” that the waiver is “freely given” before any
money is taken from workers’ paychecks.32 In so doing, Janus overturned forty years of case law that authorized agency shop fees in public sector employment.33
29. Id. at 2461 (citing 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(e), 315/3(g) (2021) (Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act)). Janus addressed First Amendment rights in the context of public sector employment. See, e.g., Rizzo-Rupon v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO Dist.
141, Loc. 914, 822 F. App’x 49, 50 (3d Cir. 2020); Popp v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, No. 19CV-61298, 2020 WL 2213155, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2020).
Public-sector unions are qualitatively different from private-sector unions. Unlike their
private-sector counterparts, the wages, benefits, working conditions, and opportunities for which
public-sector unions negotiate are provided exclusively by the government, and are paid for exclusively through tax dollars. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474–77 (noting that matters set for collective
bargaining with public sector unions are inherently political and “overwhelmingly of substantial
public concern” because they involve policy choices and the allocation of scarce resources—tax
dollars). Because the government employer is inherently monopolistic—its “customers” are forced
to pay—the consequences of public sector union bargaining are unlike the consequences of such
bargaining in the competitive private-sector market, where the bottom-line consequences of collective bargaining (the purchase price of the company’s product or service) set the ultimate boundaries
of what workers can demand from management. If management and unions reach an unsustainable
bargain in the private sector, the company will fail. But government never goes out of business. See
Mark Klock, Janus v. AFSCME: Triumph of Free Speech or Doom for Unions?, 2019 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 979, 1030–32.
However, the West Virginia Supreme Court in Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL-CIO, 842
S.E.2d 455, 475, 478 (W. Va. 2020), invoked the principles underlying Janus in upholding rightto-work legislation against a union’s claim that it violated its freedom of association under the state
constitution. See also Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988) (National
Labor Relations Act precludes private employers from requiring workers in the bargaining unit
who do not want to be union members to pay any portion of the union dues that is used for activities
other than negotiating and administering collective bargaining agreements).
30. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (alteration in original) (quoting A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphasis and
footnote omitted)).
31. Id. The Court observed that free speech is “essential to our democratic form of government” and “furthers the search for truth.” Id. When the government compels speech, “individuals
are coerced into betraying their convictions,” a situation that is “always demeaning.” Id.
32. Id. at 2486 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 2457–59, overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Janus
rejected the justifications underlying Abood, holding that compelled subsidization cannot be justified by a state’s interest in “labor peace,” or “the risk of ‘free riders.’” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2466,
2469. Courts have consistently applied Janus prospectively, declining to permit public employees
to recover fees paid prior to June 27, 2018, on the grounds that unions relied on Abood in good
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As a result, public employees can no longer be compelled, as a
condition of employment, to join or not to join, or to pay dues to a
union.34 However, many public employees join unions and pay dues
without knowing they have a choice,35 a fact that California’s response
to Janus capitalizes on.
B. California’s Legislative Response
On the day that Janus was decided, California Governor Jerry
Brown signed SB 86636 into law.37 To discourage public employees
faith. On January 25, 2021, the Supreme Court rejected six petitions for certiorari asking whether
a “good faith defense” exists to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Order List, 592 U.S.
— (Jan. 21, 2021) (slip op., at 3, 6), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/012521zor
_3f14.pdf [https://perma.cc/L56U-5YH9] (denying certiorari in Janus v. American Fed’n of State,
County and Municipal Emps., Council 31, No. 19-1104; Mooney v. Ill. Educ. Ass’n, No. 19-1126;
Danielson v. Inslee, No. 19-1130; Casanova v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Loc. 701, No. 20-20; Lee
v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, No. 20-422; Ogle v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Ass’n, No. 20-486). Yet workers continue to send a steady stream of petitions to the High Court, seeking relief. See Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at i, Bennett v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, AFL-CIO, No.
20-1603 (May 14, 2021) (asking “[w]hether an employee’s signature on a union membership card
and dues deduction authorization by itself authorizes a government employer and public-sector
union to withhold union dues or other fees from an employee’s wages consistent with this Court’s
affirmative consent waiver requirement set forth in Janus?”), petition denied, 142 S. Ct. 424 (2021);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Troesch v. Chi. Tchrs. Union, Loc. Union No. 1, No. 20-1786
(June 21, 2021) (same), petition denied, 142 S. Ct. 425 (2021); Joint Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at i, Brice v. Cal. Faculty Ass’n, No. 21-480 (Sept. 23, 2021) (good faith defense), petition denied,
142 S. Ct. 587 (2021); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Wolf v. Univ. Pro. & Tech. Emps.,
Commc’ns Workers of Am. Loc. 9119, No. 21-612 (Oct. 21, 2021) (asking “[w]hether a union can
trap a public worker into paying dues without the ‘affirmative consent’ required by Janus v.
AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)”), petition denied, 142 S. Ct. 591 (2021).
34. The right to refrain from joining a union was acknowledged prior to Janus in Abood, 431
U.S. at 234, and Cumero v. Public Employment Relations Board, 778 P.2d 174, 190 (Cal. 1989)
(applying California law), but non-members were nonetheless required to subsidize the unions’
activities that were deemed related to its core purposes. Id. Non-members, denominated “agency
shop fee payers,” remained subjected to payroll deductions almost equivalent to full union dues.
See, e.g., Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 197 P.3d 686, 710 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); Seidemann
v. Bowen, 499 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2007). Given the almost non-existent difference between the
agency shop fees and full union dues and the pressure brought to bear by the union, few workers
resisted union membership.
35. See Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. 10–11 (Aug. 27, 2019), http://law.alaska.gov/pdf/opinions/
opinions_2019/19-002_JANUS.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL9B-LYQC] (“[S]ome collective bargaining agreements require new employees to report to the union office within a certain period of time,
where a union representative presents the new hire with the payroll deduction form” and that the
State has no way of knowing what information the employee is provided “at the critical moment
the employee is confronted with the decision whether to waive his or her First Amendment rights.”).
36. S.B. 866, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
37. The unions planned well in advance for the ruling in Janus, which, as noted, was forecast
as early as 2012 in Knox. See, e.g., Laurel Rosenhall, California Unions Planning Next Steps If
Janus Ruling Goes Against Them, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 4, 2018, 1:41 PM), https://www.sfchronicle
.com/politics/article/California-unions-planning-next-steps-if-Janus-12726938.php [https://perma
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from asserting their First Amendment rights under Janus, SB 866 prohibits public employees from talking to their own employers about
payroll deductions, union membership, or their rights under the Janus
decision.38 Instead, they are required to speak to a private third-party
(the union) that does not process or control the payroll,39 and is driven
by its own political agenda.40 Public employers must rely on the unions’ representation of employees’ opt-in decisions with only a very
limited ability to see the “clear and affirmative” waiver required by
Janus.41 SB 866 applies to all public agencies in California—over
880,000 workers.42

.cc/NY5N-GLZ6] (noting multiple pending and successful bills to counter the anticipated ruling in
favor of objecting employees in Janus, including legislation to give union members “release time”
from their jobs to recruit new members; shielding union members’ contact information from public
information requests to prevent third parties from reaching them; and ensuring unions exclusive
access to new employee orientation).
38. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3550, 3553 (West 2019); see also Memorandum from Ellie R. Austin, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Sch. & College Legal Servs. of Cal., & Sarah Hirschfeld-Sussman,
Schools Legal Counsel, Sch. & College Legal Servs. of Cal., to Superintendents/Presidents/Chancellors, Member Community College Districts, at 3, 5 (June 28, 2018), https://sclscal.org/wp-cont
ent/uploads/2018/06/06-2018CC-Janus-v.-American-Federation-of-State-County-and-MunicipalEmployees-ERASHS.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A9H-N8KU].
39. The state Controller has this responsibility for state employees, subject to information provided by human resources personnel. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 7; McLean v. State, 377 P.3d
796, 805 (Cal. 2016). SB 866 instructs unions to advise the Controller whether it has obtained
consent from public employees. The Controller may then convey the information to the employees’
payroll processor. The union need not provide any documentary evidence of consent. CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 1153(g), (h).
40. Most fundamentally, unions exist to promote the economic interests of their members,
starting with negotiation of wages and benefits and extending to a wide variety of government
policies that affect, even tangentially, the unionized workforce. For example, the California Teachers Association (CTA) defines its mission as: “to protect and promote the well-being of its members, to improve the conditions of teaching and learning, to advance the cause of free, universal,
and quality public education, to ensure that the human dignity and civil rights of all children and
youth are protected, and to secure a more just, equitable, and democratic society.” CALIFORNIA
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX (FORM 990) 1
(2012),
http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2013/940/362/2013-940362310-0a7b7b1f-9O
.pdf [https://perma.cc/65K7-UTYP]. As a practical matter, the CTA advocates on issues touching
virtually every aspect of public policy, including “racism, classism, linguicism, ableism, ageism,
heterosexism, religious bias and xenophobia.” Social Justice, CAL. TCHRS. ASS’N,
https://www.cta.org/our-advocacy/social-justice [https://perma.cc/4U23-3UR6].
41. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1153(b), (h) (“Employee requests to cancel or change deductions for
employee organizations shall be directed to the employee organization, rather than to the Controller.”).
42. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1150; Michael Maciag, States with Most Government Employees:
Totals and Per Capita Rates, GOVERNING (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.governing.com/archive/
states-most-government-workers-public-employees-by-job-type.html [https://perma.cc/28WM-M
G35] (citing 2014 ASEP Datasets & Tables: Federal Government Civilian Employment and Payroll Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2014/
econ/apes/annual-apes.html [https://perma.cc/U8RX-PKEG]).
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SB 866 prevents California public employers from conveying to
their employees even the existence of the Janus decision. For example,
American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) Local 3299 filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
state Public Employment Relations Board against the Regents of the
University of California because it “circulated documents regarding
the impact of the United States Supreme Court’s decision” in Janus
that explained that the university would no longer deduct agency shop
fees from the paychecks of employees who were not union members.43
The Board held that the communications, consisting of a letter and
“Frequently Asked Questions” document that accurately described the
Janus holdings, violated SB 866.44
Although some of the decision appears even-handed, the Board
revealed its pro-union bias by describing the Janus decision itself as
“inherently destructive” of protected rights.45 Consistent with that
premise, the Board broadly defined the statute prohibition on employer action that is reasonably likely to “deter or discourage” employee free choice to cover any action that “tend[s] to influence” such
choice, regardless of whether the action or communication actually did
deter or discourage any employees from exercising their rights to “(1)
authorize union representation, (2) become or remain a union member,
or (3) commence or continue paying union dues or fees.”46
The Board chastised the university for quickly issuing its communication, indicating a desire that its employees should hear the
news first from the university rather than the unions.47 Worse,
43. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. Loc. 3299 v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Pub.
Emp. Rels. Bd. Decision No. 2755-H, at 2 (Mar. 1, 2021), https://perb.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads
/decision-2755h.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU2V-W5BY].
44. Id. at 48, 60. The decision describes the university’s communications as “relatively truthful” but does not identify any false or misleading statements. Id. at 48. Instead, the Board complained that the university did not provide sufficient “context,” that is, the unions’ interpretation
and assessment of Janus. Id. at 42.
45. Id. at 46 n.34 (“To the extent an act is inherently destructive, it is the Janus decision.”).
This reflects the legislative history of SB 866 that “was focused on removing the public employer
from the relationship between employees and the union.” Id. at 27–28 n.23 (quoting Teamsters’
counsel at oral argument).
46. Id. at 21. The Board relied on Teamsters Local 2010 v. Regents of the University of California, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 398 (Ct. App. 2019), which held that an employer “deterred” organizing by issuing a communication that was “not coercive, in that [the employer] professed neutrality
on the issue of unionization, couched the communication in terms of providing employees with
facts, and did not threaten employees with reprisals if they unionized” because the communication
nonetheless attempted to “influence” employees.
47. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. Loc. 3299 v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., supra
note 43, at 44.
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according to the Board, the university directed its employees to itself
as their primary source of information about union membership status.48 Because the university established no business necessity to justify its communications that were likely to influence employees
choices related to union membership and dues, the Board held that the
university therefore violated SB 866 and committed an unfair labor
practice.49
In sum, SB 866 ensures that, for the vast majority of public employees, their only source of information about their First Amendment
rights implicated by union membership will come from the unions
themselves.50 Because the unions have every financial incentive to
withhold that information, and many do actually withhold it by presenting a combination membership and dues deduction form without
comment about the First Amendment,51 most public employees are left
48. Id. at 42. Unlike other statutes, SB 866 contains no “free speech safe harbor” for employers. Id. at 28–29.
49. Id. at 60. The Board issued a cease and desist order, ordered the university to remove and
rescind its communications of June 28, 2018, and ordered it to meet and confer with the union
regarding the content of a mass communication and/or distribute the union’s communications on
Janus to all employees. Id. at 61.
50. The Public Employment Relation Board’s decision disclaimed that the university was entirely prohibited from communicating with its employees about Janus, but immediately limited that
statement by noting that any such communication would have to be crafted with union participation
or sent simultaneously with a union communication. Id. at 53 n.38. Laws echoing some of SB 866’s
provisions have passed in Washington, New Jersey, Illinois, and Massachusetts. See, e.g., S.B.
1784, 101st Gen Assemb. (Ill. 2019). Among its provisions, the Illinois law grants the unions the
exclusive ability to authorize cessation of dues deductions, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6 (f-15)(1),
contains an automatic renewal provision except for a 10-day window period during which the employee may ask the union to cease making deductions, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6 (f), and gives the
union exclusive access to employees’ personal contact information. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6
(2021). If the employer receives a request for such information under the state’s public records act
request, it must inform the union. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6 (c-5) (2021); see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:13A-5.11 (West 2018) (limiting right to revoke authorization for dues deductions, prohibiting
communication between government employers and their employees about the employees’ First
Amendment rights related to union membership, granting unions exclusive access to employees’
personal information and to meet personally with employees); Shira Schoenberg, Lawmakers Grant
Public Unions More Power; Group Threatens Lawsuit, MASSLIVE (Sept. 19, 2019, 5:20 PM),
https://www.masslive.com/news/2019/09/lawmakers-grant-public-unions-more-power-groupthreatens-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/6VZ2-FWLB].
51. See Union Membership & Dues Deduction Authorization Form, ASEA/AFSCME Local
52, https://www.afscmelocal52.org/member [https://perma.cc/99C7-QL4E] (stating, in whole,
“YES! I choose to be a union member. I understand my membership supports the organization
advocating for my interests as a bargaining unit member and as an individual. ASEA negotiated
labor contracts result in better wages, benefits and working conditions. Union strength is a reflection of its membership. Being a member makes the union more effective for everyone. ASEA membership is opt-in and paying union dues is not a condition of employment. By submitting this form
I choose to be a union member.”); see also SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION, LOC. 1000, MEMBERSHIP
APPLICATION 1, https://www.seiu1000.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/membershipform.pdf
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without the ability to make a choice about union membership or any
kind of understanding of that choice’s implications for their constitutional rights.
II. THE WAIVER OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS REQUIRES
VOLUNTARY, INFORMED, AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
In Johnson v. Zerbst,52 the Supreme Court established the basic
parameters of a constitutional waiver. Waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,”53 and
whether such a relinquishment or abandonment has occurred depends
“in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
that case, including the background, experience, and conduct” of the
person who chooses whether to waive a constitutional right.54 Zerbst
applies where a State bears the burden of showing a waiver of constitutional rights.55

[https://perma.cc/SRH3-GXFP] (“With my signature below, I hereby apply for membership in
SEIU Local 1000 and hereby agree to abide by the SEIU Local 1000 bylaws and policy file. In
becoming a member, I authorize the establishment with the appropriate agency the withholding
from my pay or retirement allowance of dues and any benefit deductions. I understand that my
membership rights are set forth in the SEIU Local 1000 policy file, which is subject to amendment
by the union, and any applicable memorandum of understanding between SEIU Local 1000 and the
state of California, and that a copy of the policy file and applicable memoranda of understanding
are always available for my review. Membership includes transfers to certain co-affiliates of the
union.”); TEAMSTERS LOC. UNION 8, MEMBERSHIP AND DUES DEDUCTION AUTHORIZATION
CARD, https://www.ibtlocal8.org/docs/Membership%20and%20Dues%20Deduction%20Authorization%20Card%202018_103118.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2BP-ZHWG] (“Effective immediately, I
hereby voluntarily authorize and direct Penn State to deduct from my pay each and every month,
regardless of whether I am or remain a member of the Union, the amount of dues and assessments
certified by the Union, and as they may be adjusted periodically by the Union. I further authorize
Penn State to remit such amount and direct such amounts so deducted to be turned over each month
to the secretary/treasurer of such local union for and on my behalf. I recognize that neither this
authorization nor its continuation is a condition of my employment. This voluntary authorization
and assignment shall be irrevocable, regardless of whether I am or remain a member of the Union,
for a period of one year from the date of execution of this authorization or until the termination date
of the collective bargaining agreement between Penn State and the Union, whichever occurs sooner,
and for the years to come, unless I give Penn State and the Union written notice of revocation
during the fifteen (15) days before the annual anniversary date of this authorization or, during the
fifteen (15) days before the date of termination of the collective bargaining between Penn State and
the Union, whichever occurs sooner.”).
52. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
53. Id. at 464.
54. Id.
55. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 450 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he burden
of proving the validity of a waiver of constitutional rights is always on the government.” (citing
cases)); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (right to the assistance of counsel
at trial); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (right to confront adverse witnesses); Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 272 (1942) (right to trial by jury).
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Requirements to waive constitutional rights are the same in both
civil and criminal contexts.56 Janus, citing Zerbst, requires the state to
present “clear and compelling evidence”57 that employees’ authorization to deduct dues and fees, a waiver of the employee’s rights against
compelled speech, is “freely given.”58 In order for waiver to be meaningful, notice of the right must also be combined with a meaningful
opportunity to exercise that right.59 An employee, therefore, must be
56. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31 (1972); Gete v. Immigr. & Naturalization
Serv., 121 F.3d 1285, 1293 (9th Cir. 1997) (principles governing waiver of constitutional rights
apply equally in criminal and civil context); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 497 (3d Cir. 1995)
(same); United States v. Loc. 1804–1, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 44 F.3d 1091, 1098
(2d Cir. 1995) (same); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Tr. Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985) (same);
Mosley v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 634 F.2d 942, 946 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981). Mosley also serves as precedent
for the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981); see
also D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (noting that waivers in the criminal
context where personal liberty is involved are parallel to civil cases involving a property right);
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) (heavy burden against the
waiver of constitutional rights in civil cases); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S.
389, 393 (1937) (same).
57. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486
(2018). The “clear and compelling” language in Janus comes from Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (plurality opinion); however, some courts use “clear and convincing” or
even conflate both. See, e.g., Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gete,
121 F.3d at 1293). In the First Amendment context, the two phrases appear synonymous. See In re
C.B.S., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 578, 584 (E.D. La. 1983) (holding “clear and compelling” evidence required that a person understood his First Amendment rights and intentionally relinquished them);
Ray v. Mangum, 788 P.2d 62, 66 (Ariz. 1989) (using “clear and convincing” and “clear and compelling” interchangeably).
58. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. Where the state creates and facilitates a system of payroll deductions for union dues and fees that infringes on employees’ First Amendment rights, the process
must survive exacting scrutiny. Id. at 2465 (“[A] compelled subsidy must ‘serve a compelling state
interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.’”). By requiring clear and compelling evidence, the Court set a higher standard than that
required to show voluntary consent in the context of waiving Fourth Amendment rights to permit
a warrantless search. See, e.g., United States v. Blomquist, 976 F.3d 755, 758 (6th Cir. 2020) (“The
government bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence, through clear
and positive testimony, that the consent was voluntary, unequivocal, specific, intelligently given,
and uncontaminated by duress or coercion.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Sallis, 920 F.3d
577, 582 (8th Cir. 2019) (government must show, by preponderance of the evidence, that consent
was freely given); cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (“mere submission” will not meet
state’s burden). This is consistent with the foundational dividing line between the First and Fourth
Amendments; namely, that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness,’” a standard which “is judged by balancing [the search’s] intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion
of legitimate governmental interests,” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53
(1995) (citation omitted), while the First Amendment abhors “ad hoc balancing of relative social
costs and benefits.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010); accord, e.g., Brown v. Ent.
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011).
59. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); see also Mazdabrook Commons
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 46 A.3d 507, 521 (N.J. 2012) (ostensible waiver of homeowner’s
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presented with and understand “the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”60 The failure to provide information necessary to make an informed, knowing
waiver unconstitutionally burdens public employees’ First Amendment rights.
A. The Waiver Must Be Voluntary
An employee’s waiver of constitutional rights is voluntary only if
the employee made “a free and deliberate choice” without “coercion
or improper inducement.”61 The mere presence of choice does not
eliminate the possibility of compulsion.62 “The legitimacy of a choice
largely depends on the coerciveness of the proffered alternatives.”63
Among other things, courts must vigilantly protect workers from
“stealthy encroachments,” “subtly coercive” tactics to sway a person’s
volition, and “the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
who consents.”64
right to post signs before getting homeowner association board approval, “without any idea about
what standards would govern the approval process,” could not “constitute a knowing, intelligent,
voluntary waiver of constitutional rights”).
60. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 (1988) (citation omitted); Berghuis v. Thompkins,
560 U.S. 370, 382–83 (2010) (The waiver inquiry “has two distinct dimensions”: waiver must be
“voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (citation omitted)); see also J.D.B.
v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269–70 (2011) (“[I]f a suspect makes a statement during custodial
interrogation, the burden is on the Government to show, as a ‘prerequisit[e]’ to the statement’s
admissibility as evidence in the Government’s case in chief, that the defendant ‘voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently’ waived his rights.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
61. Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2007).
62. See Ancheta v. Watada, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1126 (D. Haw. 2001) (candidate’s signing
away his First Amendment rights on a Code of Fair Campaign Practices was not voluntary because
failure to sign meant the candidate would be branded as someone who would not “uphold basic
principles of decency, honesty, and fair play”); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968)
(“[W]e find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to
assert another.”).
63. Deering v. Brown, 839 F.2d 539, 542–43 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v.
Forest City/Dillon-Tecon Pac., 522 F.2d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that when an employer
prematurely recognizes a union as exclusive representative with a union security clause, this constitutes “joint employer-union coercion” and deprives an employee of a choice whether to join or
not without the need for threats or “other coercive tactics”).
64. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973). Unfortunately, when unions are
entrusted with obtaining constitutional waivers, some choose to engage in fraud rather than permit
employees to exercise legitimate choice. See Schiewe v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Loc. 503, No. 20CV-00519, 2020 WL 5790389, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2020) (public employee plaintiff alleged that
union forged her name on union membership application, resulting in deduction of wages without
her consent); Zielinski v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Loc. 503, 499 F. Supp. 3d 804, 809 (D. Or. 2020),
appeal filed, No. 20-36076 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2020) (public employee claimed constitutional harm
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In Miranda, the Court explained at length that in-custody interrogation presents significant psychological factors that effectively pressure suspects into waiving their rights.65 These need not rise to the
level of “physical coercion or patent psychological ploys.”66 Instead,
the Court referred to any police strategies that lacked “appropriate
safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice.”67
As a practical matter,68 public employees in California are entirely reliant on union membership information provided to them by
the very union that enjoys exclusive representation rights over the
workforce.69 Typically, unions provide little information about their

stemming from union’s forgery of the employee’s signature on documents authorizing dues deductions); Yates v. Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., 466 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1203–04 (W.D. Wash. 2020),
appeal filed sub nom. AFSCME Council 28 (WFSE), No. 20-35879 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 10, 2020)
(same); Quezambra v. United Domestic Workers of Am. AFSCME Loc. 3930, 445 F. Supp. 3d
695, 706 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (same). The Supreme Court noted unions’ disregard for individual employees’ rights in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 314–
15 (2012), in which, 25 years after the Court established minimum procedures to protect dissenters’
rights in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 304
(1986), unions still sought to evade the necessity of acquiring permission to take money from employee paychecks for explicit political advocacy. Particularly galling, the advocacy in Knox was
support of a ballot initiative indented to restrict the rights of nonunion public employees. Knox, 567
U.S. at 316.
65. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448–56 (1966) (describing an array of tactics intended
to pressure, intimidate, trick, or otherwise induce a confession).
66. Id. at 457.
67. Id.
68. As discussed infra note 131 and accompanying text, public employees may obtain information by happenstance—talk radio or a podcast or comments by a friend or relation—but California government employers and agencies have yet to provide any information directly to public
employees, even under the circumstances narrowly permitted by SB 866.
69. “Exclusive representation” means that the union negotiates and enforces a collective bargaining agreement that covers every employee in the bargaining unit, regardless of whether individual employees are union members or not. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
220–23 (1977). While unions have claimed that exclusive representation statutes enable “free riding” by non-union members who nonetheless “benefit” from union membership, Janus viewed exclusive representation as a boon that unions “avidly” seek because it “confers many benefits” such
as “giv[ing] the union a privileged place in negotiations over wages, benefits, and working conditions”—making it the only entity that the government is “required by state law to listen to”—thus
resulting in a “‘tremendous increase in the power’ of the union.” Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty.,
& Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2467 (2018) (citation omitted). A union with exclusive
representation status also enjoys exclusive access to on-site communications facilities whereby the
government (upon the request of the union during contract negotiations) may bar information from
rival unions or organizations that oppose unionization. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983); see also id. at 70 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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finances and internal workings that would permit a run-of-the-mill
employee to understand how their union dues are spent.70
The most obvious place an employee would go to ask such questions is the human resources office, which answers questions on every
other topic regarding compensation and benefits.71 Only with regard
to union membership and First Amendment rights must California
state and local employers withhold information necessary for employees to make a meaningful choice. Instead, employees are referred to
self-interested third parties: public employee unions.72 California education reporter Michael Antonucci explains the increasingly narrow
hoops that teachers must jump through to resign from the California
Teachers Association (the state’s largest public employee union):
Once a California Teachers Association member submits a request to
resign during the short window period, in writing, with an original signature, delivered via U.S. Mail or in person to the union local’s headquarters, the local officer will “identify the most compelling person to
hold a one-on-one conversation with the member. . . . The benefits of

70. See ROBERT P. HUNTER ET AL., THE MICHIGAN UNION ACCOUNTABILITY ACT: A STEP
TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2001), http://www.
mackinac.org/archives/2001/s2001-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX9C-9LGK] (“[U]nions, set up to
empower workers, provide far less financial information to their members—whose mandatory fees
support them—than a publicly held corporation must . . . provide to its shareholders.”). Unions
generally face nominal financial disclosure requirements. Id. at 3; see also Harry G. Hutchison, A
Clearing in the Forest: Infusing the Labor Union Dues Disputes with First Amendment Values, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1309, 1396–97 (2006) (detailing lack of information provided and the
resulting fact that workers do not enforce their constitutional rights).
71. See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
CAL.
DEP’T
OF
HUM.
RES.,
https://www.calhr.ca.gov/pages/faqs.aspx [https://perma.cc/V4T4-JRPG] (addressing all manner
of benefits programs, workers’ compensation, and labor relations except as relates to employees’
First Amendment rights); CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFF., DEDUCTION PROGRAM HANDBOOK
22–31, https://www.sco.ca.gov/Files-PPSD/deduction_program_handbook_1119.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/5NDU-2RDD] (detailing procedures for employees to request “voluntary miscellaneous payroll deductions”); see also Faculty and Staff: Benefits, UC SAN DIEGO, https://blink.ucsd.edu/HR
/benefits/index.html [https://perma.cc/3EMU-LKSS] (last updated Sept. 23, 2020, 1:38 PM); Faculty & Staff: Compensation, UC SAN DIEGO, https://blink.ucsd.edu/HR/comp-class/compensation/
index.html [https://perma.cc/BG96-HX27] (last updated Oct. 14, 2021, 3:24 PM).
72. Cf. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC v. Glover, 766 S.E.2d 456, 467 (Ga. 2014) (state may
contract with a private company to perform probation services so long as the state provides adequate supervision to ensure that individuals receive all due process protections); Little Rock Fam.
Planning Servs. v. Rutledge, 398 F. Supp. 3d 330, 415 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (“States may not outsource
their duty to protect the constitutional rights of their citizens.” (citing Jackson Women’s Health
Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2536 (2016))).
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collective bargaining and advocacy should be discussed, and all the
member benefits that will be lost should be shared.”73
Under these conditions, many workers infer from the unions’
communications that they are required to support the union as a condition of their employment.74
Such meetings may be considered analogous to attorneys’ in-person solicitation of clients in hospital rooms or at accident sites, which
are prohibited by ethical codes because they tend to “breed[] undue
influence,”75 or to the “inevitably seductive effect of repeated assurances that the interrogator is there ‘to help.’”76 When it comes to employers, courts frequently infer the presence of implicit pressure. For
example, one-on-one meetings by employers with employees to discourage union activities are prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act.77 Federal labor law also finds implicit pressure—and an unfair labor practice—if employers offer a pay raise or propose settling
grievances during a union organization drive.78
73. See Michael Antonucci, Antonucci: What Does It Take to Resign from a California Teachers Union?, LA SCH. REP. (July 17, 2019), http://laschoolreport.com/antonucci-what-does-it-tak
e-to-resign-from-a-california-teachers-union/ [https://perma.cc/W9VL-NVPM]; see also Boardman v. Inslee, 978 F.3d 1092, 1130 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bress, J., dissenting) (by giving a public employee union, and only the union, “exclusive access to critical information,” the union can then
“engage in core political speech with in-home care workers, including speech that promotes the
Unions themselves”).
74. There are any number of reasons why employee preferences may diverge from those of
the union leadership. Some workers may want to bargain “as individuals rather than to have to pool
that leverage and deal with the elected leaders of some representative.” Michael C. Harper, A
Framework for the Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement, 76 IND. L.J. 103, 124 (2001).
Some workers may object to associating with a union that exhibits hostility to part-time work,
Conley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 539 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Mass. 1989), or that calculates seniority differently depending on whether interim breaks in service were due to pregnancy or other
reasons, Lynn Tchrs. Union, Loc. 1037 v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 549 N.E.2d 97,
101 (Mass. 1990), or that metes out informal “discipline” that affects an employee’s economic
interests in order to “protect the interests of the union or its membership,” Breininger v. Sheet Metal
Workers Int’l Ass’n Loc. Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 97 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
75. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977).
76. State v. Luckett, 981 A.2d 835, 846 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (rejecting “unspoken inducement to waive the right to counsel”).
77. See, e.g., Charter Commc’ns, Inc. v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 939 F.3d 798, 812 (6th Cir.
2019).
78. See, e.g., Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agric. Lab. Rels. Bd., 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 161–62
(2018) (pay raise created an “inference of direct dealing,” an unfair labor practice); Charter
Commc’ns, Inc., 939 F.3d at 812–13 (employer cannot solicit grievances during a union organization drive because of the “implied suggestion” that problems can be resolved without the union);
see also Daniel V. Johns, Promises, Promises: Rethinking the NLRB’s Distinction Between Employer and Union Promises During Representation Campaigns, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 433,
435 (2008) (“Union representation campaigns are perhaps the only type of elections that prohibit
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The implicit pressure presents a potentially coercive situation.79
At best, the unions’ omission of any reference to employees’ First
Amendment rights discourages employees from thinking about them.
As such, a state relying on a union’s say-so can never be confident that
employees voluntarily consent to waive their rights.
B. The Waiver Must Be Informed by Knowledge of the Relevant
Rights and the Consequences of Waiving Them
Janus holds that any waiver of First Amendment rights must be
made “clearly” by “affirmative consent” that is “freely given” by employees “before any money is taken from them.”80 That is, public employees must be informed about their First Amendment rights as a
necessary precondition to making an informed decision as to whether
to join or subsidize a public employee union.81 An affirmative waiver
of First Amendment rights must be based on actual knowledge of the

one party [employers] from explaining to voters exactly what the consequences of their vote for
that party will be.”).
79. Unions rely heavily on peer pressure, intimidation, coercion, and inertia to prevent dissenting members and non-members from opposing union political activities. See 1 MURRAY N.
ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 626 (1970);
F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 274 (1960); LINDA CHAVEZ & DANIEL GRAY,
BETRAYAL: HOW UNION BOSSES SHAKE DOWN THEIR MEMBERS AND CORRUPT AMERICAN
POLITICS 44–46 (2004). This is why nonconformists must rely on the Constitution for protection.
See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); Washington v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982) (finding the judiciary has a special duty to intercede on
behalf of political minorities who cannot hope for protection from the majoritarian political process).
80. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486
(2018) (emphasis added); see also Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889–90 (9th Cir. 1993) (First
Amendment rights may be waived only if the waiver is “knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”);
Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[C]onstitutional
rights may ordinarily be waived [only] if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence
that the waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.”); cf. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r
1.0.1 (2018) (The California Supreme Court defines “informed consent” as “agreement to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated and explained (i) the relevant circumstances and (ii) the material risks, including any actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of the proposed course of conduct.”).
81. See Kimberly S. Webster, Fissured Employment Relationships and Employee Rights Disclosures: Is the Writing on the Wall for Workers’ Right to Know Their Rights?, 6 NE. U. L.J. 435,
435 (2014) (“A right does not exist in any meaningful sense unless people know about it and have
the means to exercise it.”); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 158 (1990) (“To translate abstract legal rights on the books into
practical guarantees in the workplace, the employee needs to be informed what his rights are . . . .”);
Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees of Their Rights
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 438 (1995) (“Ignorance of
the law disempowers people. It prevents them from seeking redress for legal wrongs, and also
causes them to shy away from taking actions to which they are legally entitled.”).

(7) 55.2_LAFETRA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

424

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

5/5/22 2:05 PM

[Vol. 55:405

content and consequences of the waiver.82 A waiver is “knowing [and]
intelligent” when “done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”83
This is consistent with Miranda, which holds that “[n]o effective
waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized
unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have
been given.”84 As the Miranda Court explained:
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be
used against the individual in court. . . . It is only through an
awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the
privilege.85
Courts have held that someone cannot waive a “known” right if
the right itself was “unknown” prior to a particular Supreme Court
opinion defining that right.86 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,87 a First
Amendment case in which a college athletic director sued a newspaper
publisher for libel after it printed an untrue story that he tried to “fix”
a game, the defendant publisher asserted a defense on appeal based on
the newly decided New York Times v. Sullivan case.88 The plaintiff
82. See Bayo v. Napolitano, 593 F.3d 495, 504 (7th Cir. 2010) (refusing to substitute a “presumption of knowledge for the requirement of actual knowledge” as “it would render all waivers
of constitutional rights signed without coercion valid, regardless of whether the signatory understood a single word on the page”); Nose v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 993 F.2d 75, 78–79 (5th Cir. 1993)
(same).
83. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (factors for determining when a guilty
plea waives the right against self-incrimination); Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930
F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[C]onstitutional rights may ordinarily be waived [only] if it can
be established by clear and convincing evidence that the waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.”); Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 584 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
84. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).
85. Id. at 469 (emphasis added); see also Walker v. Pepersack, 316 F.2d 119, 127–28 (4th Cir.
1963) (holding that a criminal defendant could not have waived the rule protecting against unconstitutional searches when the search occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), because “it is clear that he did not intentionally abandon a known
right since there was no such right for him to abandon . . . before the Supreme Court’s decision”
(emphasis omitted)).
86. See Walker, 316 F.2d at 127–28 (holding that a criminal defendant could not have waived
the rule protecting against unconstitutional searches when the search occurred prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655); see also Felter v. S. Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326, 336 (1959)
(“[W]e doubt whether the right to revoke [wage assignment for union dues] could be waived at all
in advance of the time for its exercise . . . .”).
87. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
88. Id. at 143; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that “[t]he
constitutional guarantees [of freedom of speech and press] require . . . a federal rule that prohibits
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argued that the publisher waived the defense by not raising it before
trial.89 The Supreme Court plurality rejected this argument and explained the effect of a new Supreme Court decision, New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, on the defendant publisher’s purported waiver:90
[A]s a general matter, we think it inadvisable to determine
whether a “right or privilege” is “known” by relying on information outside the record concerning the special legal
knowledge of particular attorneys. . . . We think that it was
our eventual resolution of New York Times, rather than its
facts and the arguments presented by counsel, which brought
out the constitutional question here. We would not hold that
Curtis waived a “known right” before it was aware of the
New York Times decision.91
The First Amendment context was a key factor in the decision.
The Court noted that “the constitutional protection which Butts contends that Curtis has waived safeguards a freedom which is the ‘matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.’”92 Thus, the Court concluded, “[w]here the ultimate effect of
sustaining a claim of waiver might be an imposition on that valued
freedom, we are unwilling to find waiver in circumstances which fall
short of being clear and compelling.”93 The Janus decision relies explicitly on Curtis Publishing to delineate the requirements of a constitutional waiver.94 This principle applies in the context of labor law as
well. In International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers v. Rafferty,95 plaintiffs were
union members who angered the union leadership by circulating
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”).
89. Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 142.
90. Id. at 144–45. It was of little import that the particular attorneys involved might have foreseen the result in Sullivan given their specific knowledge of the litigation as it unfolded. Id. at 144.
91. Id. at 144–45 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 145 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)).
93. Id.
94. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486
(2018); see also GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 477 F.3d 368, 374 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The interveningchange-in-law exception to our normal waiver rules, by contrast, exists to protect those who, despite
due diligence, fail to prophesy a reversal of established adverse precedent.” (first citing Curtis
Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 143; and then citing Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 433 (1960)));
Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, 590 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2009) (a party will not be
held to have waived newly protected rights because “the doctrine of waiver demands conscientiousness, not clairvoyance, from parties”).
95. 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965).
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pamphlets and creating dissention by challenging the leadership’s proposals.96 They were expelled by the union and they sued to restore
their full union membership.97 The court held, “it is clear that the offenses charged against the appellees were protected activities under
the Landrum-Griffin Act for which the Union could not, as a matter of
law, penalize the appellees.”98 The court addressed rights asserted after a relevant case, Salzhandler v. Caputo,99 established rights, adopting and quoting the district court ruling:
At the time the agreement was signed plaintiffs were presumed to know the provisions of Sections 1 and 13 of Article
XIII of the Union constitution, the provisions of which are as
stated in the charges against plaintiffs . . . . The Salzhandler
case was not decided until April 18, 1963, so the court infers
that plaintiffs were not aware of the rule as announced in that
case to wit: that the making of false and libelous statements
concerning a member or officer of a Union may not subject
a member to expulsion on a finding by the governing board
of said Union that such statements were untrue, slanderous
or libelous. It is therefore concluded that the agreement was
signed when the plaintiffs were not aware of their rights with
respect to the distribution as accomplished by them of circulars containing false and untruthful statements as to officers
of the Union. It follows that the agreement did not constitute
a waiver of the rights of plaintiffs as announced in the
Salzhandler case and plaintiffs are not estopped to assert
said rights in the instant matter.100
The Supreme Court suggested the type of information and
knowledge relevant to a waiver of First Amendment rights in Knox v.
SEIU, Local 1000.101 In that case, the union deducted money from
agency shop fee payer paychecks mid-year, for the purpose of advocating against two ballot initiatives.102 Unlike the opt-out procedure
then in place for annual dues, the union did not give the workers an
opportunity to opt-out of the mid-year deduction, nor did it give them
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 310.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 312.
316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963).
Rafferty, 348 F.2d at 313–14 (emphases added).
567 U.S. 298 (2012).
Id. at 315.
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any information relevant to making a choice whether to do so.103 In
the context of that case, which concerned only political activities as
defined under Abood, the critical information withheld from workers
was how the union intended to use the funds.104
The Court explicitly tied this holding to the constitutional requirement that employees must provide informed consent to the union’s deductions:
Giving employees only one opportunity per year to make this
choice is tolerable if employees are able at the time in question to make an informed choice. But a nonmember cannot
make an informed choice about a special [mid-year] assessment or dues increase that is unknown when the annual notice is sent.105
In the post-Janus world, information that public employees need to
know to make an informed decision is that they have constitutional
rights relating to union membership and dues that give them the option
of continuing their employment without joining or subsidizing the union. Unions can and do fail to provide the information or opportunity
necessary to make an informed decision whether to waive106 and a union’s “restrictive resignation scheme is undoubtedly a factor in weighing the pros and cons of union membership.”107 Under the communications blackout mandated by SB 866, however, California cannot
satisfy Janus’s requirement that it only deduct dues after a knowing
waiver has been provided.

103. Id. at 314.
104. Id. at 315. Among other things, the Court noted that workers may have favored one or both
of the targeted initiatives or may simply have not wanted to delegate to the union how to allocate
the workers’ dollars on political matters.
105. Id. (emphases added).
106. In fact, public employee unions have a long, documented history of failing to provide
adequate information regarding dues payments. See Masiello v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 113 F. Supp.
2d 870, 877–78 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (noting the “woeful inadequacy and downright arrogance of the
union’s practices and procedures” that halved the amount of the dues reduction to which nonmembers were entitled).
107. Lutter v. JNESO, No. 19-13478, 2020 WL 7022621, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2020); see also
Knox, 567 U.S. at 315 (noting that a non-union member’s choice to support a union’s political activities, through electing to pay dues or a special assessment, may change “as a result of unexpected
developments” in the union’s political advocacy).
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C. The Waiver Must be Affirmative, Not Presumed
If public employees wish to waive their First Amendment right to
refrain from subsidizing a union, they may do so. But the waiver of
constitutional rights cannot be presumed.108 As Janus explains:
Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union
may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any
other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the
employee affirmatively consents to pay. By agreeing to pay,
nonmembers are waiving their First Amendment rights, and
such a waiver cannot be presumed.109
To comply with the Constitution, therefore, public employers must
obtain affirmative consent from workers before deducting money from
their paychecks and redirecting that money to the public employee unions.110 This standard is often referred to in shorthand as “opt-in” as
opposed to “opt-out.” That is, an employee must “opt-in”—affirmatively choose—to join and subsidize the union.111
D. The Waiver Must Be Reasonably Contemporaneous
Neither the invocation nor waiver of a constitutional right exists
in perpetuity.112 For example, in Maryland v. Shatzer,113 a criminal
suspect invoked his right to an attorney during an initial interview with
the police, at which point the police terminated the interview.
108. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (“[A] waiver of constitutional rights in any
context must, at the very least, be clear.”); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972) (“[P]resuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction[] is inconsistent with this Court’s pronouncements
on waiver of constitutional rights.”); Brammer v. KB Home Lone Star, L.P., 114 S.W.3d 101, 109–
10 (Tex. App. 2003) (courts cannot find waiver “by implication”); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506, 516 (1962) (“Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.”); Spiller v. State, 182
N.W.2d 242, 243 (Wis. 1971) (“[S]ilence as consent is not a reasonable inference when affirmative
acts of consent and approval are required.”); State v. Coita, 568 A.2d 424, 425 (Vt. 1989) (silent
acquiescence, instead of an affirmative indication of consent, provides no evidence that someone
“thought about the decision”).
109. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486
(2018).
110. Id.
111. The Supreme Court required “opt-in” for mid-year special assessments by a union to finance political activism in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, and
acknowledged that “opt-out” for annual agency shop fees raised troubling constitutional questions.
Knox, 567 U.S. at 314–15 (holding the union’s procedure to opt-out of mid-year assessments to be
an “aggressive use of power” that was “indefensible”). Annual assessments were not at issue in
Knox.
112. See United States v. Mortensen, 860 F.2d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The continuity of
consent, however, is only a presumption. . . . Like the waiver of some other constitutional rights, it
should not, once uttered, be deemed forever binding.”).
113. 559 U.S. 98, 101 (2010).
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However, in a later interview, the suspect waived his rights and consented to a polygraph test, after which he made several inculpatory
statements.114 When he sought to have the statements excluded from
the subsequent criminal trial, the Supreme Court held that his invocation of rights during the first interview expired between the first interview and the second interview.115 Just as an invocation of rights can
expire, so too can a waiver grow stale over time.
This requirement of a fresh waiver takes on heightened importance
after a significant change in the law. In the criminal context, when looking at the “totality of the circumstances,” the state may need to repeat
Miranda warnings when intervening events give the impression that a
defendant’s rights have changed in a material way since the defendant
was previously advised of his rights.116 The length of time that either
invocation or waiver of constitutional rights remains operative depends on the circumstances.117 Because waivers must be informed, “a
second waiver may be required if the original waiver insufficiently
disclosed the nature” of a protected interest.118
In Knox, the Supreme Court noted that the circumstances that an
employee would consider in deciding whether to waive First Amendment rights are likely to change over time—not only the actions and
114. Id. at 101–02.
115. Id. at 110. While the interrogations in Shatzer were interrupted by two years, the Court
noted that two weeks suffices to render a waiver stale. Id. at 111–12; see also United States v.
Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (repeat Miranda warnings required when an “appreciable time” elapses between interrogations).
116. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (“A once-stated warning, delivered by those
who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most require
knowledge of their rights.”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1128–29 (9th
Cir. 2005) (interval of 16 hours to 3 days does not necessarily require a second warning, depending
on the circumstances).
117. See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 47 (1982) (per curiam); see also State v. Prue, 153 A.3d
551, 561 (Vt. 2016) (whether Miranda warnings have gone stale requires consideration of the “totality of the circumstances”) (citation omitted). Factors may include:
(1) the length of time between the giving of the first warnings and the subsequent interrogation; (2) whether the warnings and the subsequent interrogation were given in the
same or different places; (3) whether the warnings were given and the subsequent interrogation conducted by the same or different officers; (4) the extent to which the subsequent statement differed from any previous statements; (5) the apparent intellectual and
emotional state of the suspect.
In re Miah S., 861 N.W.2d 406, 413 (Neb. 2015) (internal ellipses omitted) (quoting State v.
McZorn, 219 S.E.2d 201, 212 (N.C. 1975), judgment vacated in part in McZorn v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 904 (1976)).
118. W. Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1082 (C.D. Cal.
2015) (invalidating client’s open-ended general waiver of a conflict of interest); see also Carter v.
McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1986) (defendant not fully aware of the consequences of
his guilty plea did not make a “voluntary and intelligent” waiver).
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positions of the union, but also the employee’s own beliefs or opinions.119 As the attorneys general of Indiana, Alaska, and Texas have
opined,120 Janus’s requirement that the state obtain “clear and compelling” evidence of each employee’s affirmative, informed waiver
therefore “demands some periodic inquiry into whether a public employee wishes to continue to waive—or reclaim—his or her First
Amendment rights.”121

119. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 315 (2012) (an employee’s
choice to support a union may change “as a result of unexpected developments” in the union’s
political advocacy).
120. State attorneys general are the only judicial officers to date to issue opinions on the need
for contemporaneous, renewed waivers. Dozens of public employees who signed union cards prior
to Janus have filed lawsuits in federal courts across the country, seeking to be released from their
union membership and freed from the unions’ taking dues from their paychecks. However, union
defendants effectively moot the cases by accepting their resignations and returning the dues deducted from their paychecks, plus interest. Having provided to the employee-plaintiffs all the monetary relief they seek, federal courts unanimously hold that the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue
any claims against the unions, including related constitutional claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Therefore, no court has yet ruled on the temporal issue. See, e.g., Diamond v. Pa.
State Educ. Ass’n, 399 F. Supp. 3d 361, 386 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (citing Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ.
Ass’n, 390 F. Supp. 3d 592, 601 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (holding that in light of Janus, a similar claim
seeking relief is moot since “[p]laintiffs face no realistic possibility that they will be subject to the
unlawful collection of ‘fair share’ fees”)); Lamberty v. Conn. State Police Union, No. 15-cv-378,
2018 WL 5115559, at *9 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2018), appeal dismissed, 828 F. App’x 49 (2d Cir.
2020) (explaining that Janus mooted a challenge to the constitutionality of agency fees because
“there is nothing for [the court] to order [the d]efendants to do now”); Yohn v. Cal. Tchrs. Ass’n,
No. SACV 17-202, 2018 WL 5264076, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018) (granting the union’s motion to dismiss on mootness grounds after the union complied with Janus); Danielson v. Inslee, 345
F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1339–40 (W.D. Wash. 2018), aff’d, 945 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that
Janus mooted a controversy when the State of Washington stopped collecting agency fees postJanus). Plaintiffs’ efforts to seek class certification to avoid mootness on these grounds have failed
because of the difficulty of defining a class and identifying lead plaintiffs who are representative
of varying subclasses. See, e.g., Hoekman v. Educ. Minn., 335 F.R.D. 219, 240 (D. Minn. 2020)
(rejecting “reluctant” and “reluctant-uninformed” union member subclasses).
121. Official Opinion No. 2020-5, at 5, Op. Att’y Gen. of Ind. (June 17, 2020); see id. at 6
(“[T]he State or a political subdivision must also provide for a regular opt-in period, during which
time all employees will be permitted to decide whether or not they want to waive their First Amendment rights by authorizing future deductions from their wages. To ensure constitutional validity,
we think it is reasonable that such a waiver be obtained annually.”); Op. Alaska Att’y Gen., supra
note 35, at 7 (same); id. at 12 (“Requiring consent to be renewed on an annual basis would ensure
that consents do not become stale (due to intervening events, including developments in the union’s
speech that may cause employees to reassess their desire to subsidize that speech and promotes
administrative and employee convenience by integrating the payroll deduction process with other
benefits-elections employees are asked to make at the end of every calendar year.”); see also Official Opinion No. KP-0310, at 3, Op. Att’y Gen. of Tex. (May 31, 2020), https://www.texasattorn
eygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2020/kp-0310.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM95AY84] (“[A] one-time, perpetual authorization is inconsistent with the Court’s conclusion in Janus
that consent must be knowingly and freely given. Organizations change over time, and consent to
membership should not be presumed to be indefinite.” (citation omitted)).
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III. MIRANDA FOR JANUS
A special constitutional rule along the lines of the Miranda warning is warranted in this context because public employee unions enjoy
a unique elevated status as a government partner with exclusive rights
to represent all employees in a bargaining unit, whether those employees wish to be represented or not. Because the severe potential infringement of employees’ First Amendment rights requires informed
consent in the public union context, the state has an elevated duty to
ensure that employees have sufficient knowledge of their options before being asked to waive their rights and join a public-employee union. In this limited context of being asked to join a public-employee
union, the government has a special duty to ensure informed consent.
By ceding the process of eliciting public employees’ consent to
payroll deductions of union dues and fees to the union itself, and unquestioningly accepting union-procured consent forms, the state has
no way of ascertaining—let alone by “clear and compelling evidence”—that those consents are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
before it makes the deductions.122 The constitutional injury is even
greater when the union obtains the waiver in conditions entirely unknown to the state and then declares it irrevocable for years.123 In
122. Public employees may learn of their rights from other sources, through outreach efforts by
public interest organizations or talk radio or conversations with their friends. This has no bearing
on the state’s constitutional obligations. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471–72 (1966)
(“As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence
against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial
evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only
through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.”).
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
123. Many unions limit the ability of employees to waive their rights to a short window at the
end of a contract. See, e.g., Grossman v. Haw. Gov’t Emps. Ass’n/AFSCME Loc. 152, No. 18-CV00493, 2020 WL 515816, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 31, 2020) (union members may resign only within
an annual 30-day window prior to the anniversary date of the employee’s union membership), aff’d,
854 F. App’x 911 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, No. 21-597, 2021 WL 5763142 (Dec. 6, 2021);
Fischer v. Murphy, 842 F. App’x 741, 745 (3d Cir. 2021) (10 day revocation period), cert. denied,
142 S. Ct. 426 (2021) (mem.); Hendrickson v. AFSCME Council 18, 992 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir.
2021) (annual two-week revocation period), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 423 (2021) (mem.); Louisville
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio Ass’n of Pub. Sch. Emps. (OAPSE)/AFSCME Loc. 4 AFLCIO, No. 19-CV-1509, 2020 WL 1930131, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020) (noting annual ten-day
window to revoke union membership). If a public entity and a union agree to contract extensions,
that short window may be postponed indefinitely. See id. (one-year contract extension provided
two seven-day revocation window periods); see also SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION LOC. 1021,
EXTENSION AGREEMENT AND AMENDMENT OF MOU BETWEEN THE NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC SECTOR REGION, LOCAL 1021 OF THE SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION,
CTW AND THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 1 (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.seiu1021.org/sites/main/
files/file-attachments/alameda-county_ext._agrmnt_12.15.2019-12.10.2022.pdf?1557863810 [htt
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short, state laws that empower public employee unions to set the terms
and unilaterally define the circumstances under which employees may
waive their First Amendment rights cannot satisfy the constitutional
protections mandated by Janus.124 These laws instead place the state
in a position where it is willfully blind to the burdens placed on the
First Amendment rights of its own employees. In fact, empowering
public employee unions, who have no constitutional right to “other
people’s money,”125 with control over the fundamental constitutional
rights of workers to choose how to spend their earnings, creates an
unjust inversion of constitutional protection.126 Constitutional law
does not permit this injustice.
Public employees have a due process right to receive information
from their government employer necessary to make an effective
waiver of their First Amendment rights.127 In California, neither the
State Department of Human Resources nor the Public Employee Relations Board nor the public employee unions have provided any information to public employees about their newly recognized First

ps://perma.cc/T668-LV9F] (extending terms and conditions of previous MOU that include union
security, agency shop (98 percent of union dues and initiation fees), and payroll deduction provisions that would otherwise be invalid under Janus); Victory! San Bernardino Courts Ratifies Contract Extension, SEIU 721 (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.seiu721.org/2018/12/victory-san-bernardino-courts-ratifies-contract-extension.php [https://perma.cc/7RJ5-84JB]; 85 Fed. Reg. 41,169,
41,169 (July 9, 2020) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 2429).
124. One California public employee union, University Professional and Technical Employees
(UPTE), an affiliate of the Communications Workers of America, not only offers a short ten-day
window to revoke membership, but also requires workers to provide a copy of a photo ID to make
the revocation effective. When Amber Walker’s revocation request was denied for failure to provide photo ID, she filed a class action lawsuit challenging the requirement. UC Irvine Lab Assistant
Sues State of California over Policy Allowing Union Officials to Seize Dues in Violation of First
Amendment, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND. (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.nrtw.org/
news/uc-irvine-janus-upte-08022021/ [https://perma.cc/FBU7-SPVP].
125. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 187 (2007).
126. See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 321 (2012) (as between
public employee unions and workers, the party that should bear the risk of losing money must be
“the side whose constitutional rights are not at stake”—that is, the unions).
127. The duty originates with the state, but as with the due process notice requirements discussed supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text, the state may delegate the duty to the private
entity that stands to benefit from the waiver. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (the Fourteenth Amendment provides a “judicial obligation” to
“assure that constitutional standards are invoked ‘when it can be said that the State is responsible
for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains’” (citation omitted)); Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 932–33 (1982) (“[C]onstitutional requirements of due process apply to garnishment and prejudgment attachment procedures whenever officers of the State act jointly with a
creditor in securing the property in dispute.”).
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Amendment rights as they relate to union dues deductions.128 State law
prevents public interest organizations from obtaining employee contact information to facilitate efforts to notify employees about their
rights.129 Government premises are closed to private organizations that
seek to inform public employees about their rights.130 Public employees are left to discover their First Amendment rights solely through
happenstance131 and are therefore left ignorant about the existence and
consequences of waiving their constitutional rights that are a necessary prerequisite to exercising a valid waiver.
“Due process is not met by a procedure which accords a fundamental right only to the already informed, or which engenders unnecessary obstacles to the right’s fulfillment.”132 There is no legitimate,
much less compelling, state interest in restraining the conveyance of
information about individuals’ constitutional rights. Considered under
“exacting” scrutiny, any interests capable of being asserted by California fall far below what would be required to satisfy the standard.

128. Searches of the websites for these agencies and the SEIU and AFSCME reveal nothing to
inform the public generally or employees specifically about employees’ First Amendment rights or
the waiver requirement. Although S.B. 866, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), permits government
employers and the unions to collaborate on “mass communications” to inform employees of their
rights, the author is unaware of any instance in which this actually has occurred.
129. A split panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld a similar Washington law in Boardman v. Inslee,
978 F.3d 1092, 1113–19 (9th Cir. 2020), holding that a ballot initiative amending the state’s public
records act to permit public employee unions to obtain personal information of in-home care providers, but no one else, did not violate First Amendment’s prohibition on viewpoint discrimination
or Equal Protection Clause. In dissent, Judge Bress would have held the initiative to violate the
First Amendment because “[t]he State is effectively using an information embargo to promote the
inherently ‘pro-union’ views of the incumbent unions, while making it vastly more difficult for
those with opposing views—and particularly those with views opposite unions—to reach their intended audience.” Id. at 1120 (Bress, J., dissenting). A petition for writ of certiorari was denied.
Boardman v. Inslee, 142 S. Ct. 387 (2021) (mem.) (Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch would
have granted the petition).
130. See Freedom Found. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 840 F. App’x 903, 904 (9th Cir. 2020)
(state agency welcomes union representatives to speak to employees about union membership and
dues while forbidding representative of an organization on the premises to hand out leaflets explaining the Janus decision); see also id. at 907 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (considering this as likely
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination).
131. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 331 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting)
(“happenstance” cannot supplant constitutional rights); United States v. Unimex, Inc., 991 F.2d
546, 551 (9th Cir. 1993) (constitutional rights “could not properly be left to rely” on “fortuities”);
United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (where disclosure of information
is a necessary component of a constitutional right, the fortuity of a voluntary disclosure will not
suffice).
132. Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 114 (N.C. 1980) (schools must
affirmatively notify indigent students and their parents that fee waivers or reductions are available
and explain how the students or parents may apply for a partial or complete exemption from fee
requirements).
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Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000133 held
that those who choose not to join unions possess the same First
Amendment rights as union members to express their views:
Public-sector unions have the right under the First Amendment to express their views on political and social issues
without government interference. See, e.g., Citizens United
v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). But employees who choose not to join a union have the same rights.
The First Amendment creates a forum in which all may seek,
without hindrance or aid from the State, to move public opinion and achieve their political goals.134
The right to choose not to associate with, or to resign from, an organization such as a union invokes basic rights of freedom, a matter of
public concern. “The right to associate freely is not mentioned in the
text of the First Amendment, but has been derived over time as implicit
in and supportive of the rights identified in that amendment.”135
A law deliberately silencing state employers with the object of
leaving employees ignorant of their rights, particularly when motivated to advance a political agenda136 (as public employee unions inherently do), is a wholly illegitimate purpose that cannot survive even
rational basis review. In Dent v. West Virginia,137 the Supreme Court
examined a law regulating the medical profession and wrote that “[t]he
power of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will
secure or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance

133. 567 U.S. 298 (2012).
134. Id. at 321–22 (emphasis added).
135. Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justs. of the First, Second, Third & Fourth Dep’ts,
App. Div. of the Sup. Ct., 852 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Mulhall v. UNITE HERE
Loc. 355, 618 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Just as ‘[t]he First Amendment clearly guarantees
the right to join a union,’ Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 482 (5th Cir. 1992), it ‘presupposes a
freedom not to associate’ with a union, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).” (citations omitted)).
136. González v. Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948, 973 (D. Ariz. 2017) (government official’s
censoring of a school’s curriculum to advance a political agenda violated the students’ First Amendment rights to receive the information).
137. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
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and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud.”138 A state’s interest
is in eradicating ignorance, not promoting it.139
The state’s additional interest in granting exclusive access to unions to enable them to bolster their membership and consequent dues
payments also fails as a justification. In Arkansas Writers’ Project,
Inc. v. Ragland,140 the Supreme Court explained that “an interest in
raising revenue, ‘standing alone, . . . cannot justify the special treatment . . . for an alternative means of achieving the same interest without raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available.’”141 As Janus explained, the First Amendment demands that the
state provide an opportunity for employees to make informed decisions. In this circumstance, the government must “open the channels
of communication rather than . . . close them.”142
IV. WAIVERS MADE BY CONTRACT MUST COMPLY WITH DUE
PROCESS
Employees may waive constitutional rights by entering into contracts, such as a union membership contract, so long as the waiver is
voluntary, affirmative, and knowing.143 Although the speech and association rights protected by the First Amendment are not an overarching license to violate a contract,144 a collective bargaining agreement

138. Id. at 122; see also Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“Secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance . . . .”).
139. See Dent, 129 U.S. at 122 (a law regulating the medical profession is legitimate where it
works to secure people “against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud”); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (First Amendment freedoms
are “essential if vigorous enlightenment [is] ever to triumph over slothful ignorance”); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (“The First Amendment directs us to be
especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government
perceives to be their own good.”); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977) (striking
down disciplinary rule that prohibited lawyers from truthfully advertising the prices of routine legal
services because the rule “serve[d] to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to keep
the public in ignorance”).
140. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
141. Id. at 231 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 586 (1983) (first omission in original)).
142. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
143. See Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Burke Cnty., 149 F.3d 277, 280 (4th
Cir. 1998) (citing cases); Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 969 (9th Cir.
2011) (per curiam) (holding public employee did not knowingly waive due process rights because
the agreement “contains no express waiver of a pre-termination hearing or of the right to due process”).
144. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991).
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must give way to constitutional claims of individuals.145 In Sambo’s
Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor,146 the city revoked the plaintiff
restaurant’s sign permits and argued that Sambo’s had waived its right
to challenge the revocation.147 The Sixth Circuit had to decide whether
Sambo’s waiver of First Amendment rights was valid, employing the
“clear and compelling” evidence test and “indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption against a waiver”—the same tests demanded by Janus.148 The city argued that a contract that Sambo’s voluntarily signed
in 1972, waiving First Amendment rights, bound the restaurant and
prevented any future First Amendment claims.149 The court disagreed.150 Critically, the company could not have earlier asserted its
First Amendment rights because the relevant commercial speech
rights were not recognized at that point in time.151 When Sambo’s became “an unwitting beneficiary of [the] new constitutional doctrine”
announced in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy II152 protecting its
commercial speech, it was entitled to invoke its newly recognized First
Amendment rights. Prior to Virginia, Sambo’s “did not have First
Amendment commercial speech rights in 1972 which it could
waive.”153 Because “waiver, at the least, is the relinquishment of a
known right,” Sambo’s pre-Virginia “waiver” was ineffective.154
In Fuentes v. Shevin,155 the Supreme Court considered whether
consumer contracts that provided for summary repossession of goods
waived the consumers’ constitutional right to procedural due
145. See Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989) (rejecting union’s
position that settlement of discrimination claims would violate the seniority terms of an existing
collective bargaining agreement).
146. 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981).
147. Id. at 688–89.
148. Id. at 690.
149. Id. at 689.
150. Id. at 693.
151. Id. at 692.
152. Id. at 693; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
153. Sambo’s Restaurants, Inc., 663 F.2d at 693.
154. Id. (emphasis added); see also In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.3d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (party cannot be penalized for raising waiver issue only after a Supreme Court decision
changing the controlling law makes the issue available); United States v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, 464
F. Supp. 1037, 1048 (D. Del. 1979) (no waiver of First Amendment rights in consent order where
the rights at issue were not recognized until five years after the consent order was issued); Freedom
From Religion Found. Inc. v. Abbott, No. A-16-CA-00233, 2017 WL 4582804, at *4 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 13, 2017) (no waiver of First Amendment rights where plaintiff signed contract that did not
address constitutional rights and the parties did not negotiate or discuss the terms prior the plaintiff
signing the “stock form”).
155. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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process.156 The Court held there was no waiver.157 Among other
things, the contracts “did not indicate how or through what process”
the seller could repossess the goods.158 Moreover, the parties were not
equal in bargaining power and there was, in fact, no bargaining over
the contractual terms between the parties.159 Because waivers of constitutional rights must be made with full understanding of the consequences,160 the purported waiver in the contract was invalid.161 Thus,
the issue in the public employee union context is not whether employees know that the membership card serves as an agreement to subsidize the union; the issue is whether they know that they possess a First
Amendment right to pay nothing to the union—while retaining their
jobs—and that they were waiving that right. Payroll deduction forms
provide no evidence that employees acted with a full awareness of their
First Amendment rights as required by Janus.162
Finally, the unions’ anticipation of the new rules reduces their interests in maintaining the status quo.163 Contracts made to protect the
previous status quo when the legal framework has changed cannot outweigh the law’s legitimate ends.164 Otherwise, as Justice Holmes observed, a person whose rights “are subject to state restriction [could]
156. Id. at 94.
157. Id. at 96.
158. Id. at 95–96.
159. Id. at 95.
160. Cf. Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Constitutional protections
of due process mandate that an accused’s guilty plea be voluntary and intelligent.” The accused
must have “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequence.” (quoting Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969))); see also United States v. Basulto-Pulido, 219 F. App’x
717, 719 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A waiver is not considered and intelligent when the record contains an
inference that the petitioner is eligible for relief from deportation, but the Immigration Judge fails
to advise . . . of this possibility and [to provide an] opportunity to develop the issue.” (omission and
alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
161. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 (1988).
162. See supra note 51 (quoting several union membership and dues deductions forms). Contracts that provide for an unconstitutional waiver of First Amendment rights have an illegal purpose. See
Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1144 n.133 (C.D. Cal.
1976), judgment vacated on other grounds, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 46 A.3d 507, 522 (N.J. 2012) (holding under state constitution’s free
speech clause that “restrictive covenants that unreasonably restrict speech—a right most substantial in
our constitutional scheme—may be declared unenforceable as a matter of public policy” (quoting Comm.
for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1076 (N.J. 2007))). Beyond
the federal constitution and laws, California courts will void contracts that violate federal public policy
developed in court cases. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1948) (public policy may be found in
“applicable legal precedents”). State law cannot impose liability for conduct that federal law requires.
See, e.g., Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 486–87 (2013).
163. Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 994 (2d Cir. 1997).
164. Id.
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remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about
them.”165
V. “YOU HAVE THE RIGHT….”
A union membership card that states, without elaboration, that membership and dues payment is voluntary, cannot suffice to waive First
Amendment rights.166 A Janus disclosure warning must ensure a knowing, intelligent waiver based on an understanding of the rights to be
waived and the consequences of that waiver. While the Constitution does
not require any “talismanic incantation” to ensure a proper waiver,167
there are simple, clear ways for public employers to inform their employees. The Texas and Indiana Attorneys General propose to include this
language as part of an annually renewed public employee union membership agreement and dues deduction form:
I recognize that I have a First Amendment right to associate,
including the right not to associate. My rights provide that I
am not compelled to be a member of a labor organization. I
am not compelled to pay a labor organization any money as
a condition of employment, and I do not have to sign this
consent form. However, I am waiving this right and consent
to union membership. I also consent to having union dues
deducted from my paycheck. My consent may be revoked at
any time, resulting in the immediate termination of any financial agreement to pay the union dues, fees, or any other
form of payment.168
This language succinctly and effectively conveys the nature of the right,
the consequences of waiver, and ensures that waivers do not exist in perpetuity.
165. Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908); see also Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (regarding Sixth Amendment waiver of assistance of counsel, a
“waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.
The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”).
166. A federal district court considering a pre-Janus checkoff agreement form held that the
agreement disclosed the “essential nature” of the right to avoid joining the union and could not be
expected to anticipate the later invalidation of agency shop fees in Janus. Allen v. Ohio Civ. Serv.
Emps. Ass’n AFSCME, No. 19-CV-3709, 2020 WL 1322051, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2020).
Post-Janus obligations demand more.
167. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (“Miranda itself indicated that no
talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures.”).
168. Official Opinion No. 2020-5, supra note 121, at 4 (quoting and adopting language in Official
Opinion No. KP-0310, supra note 121, at 3).
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CONCLUSION
Public employees cannot waive their First Amendment rights and
choose to subsidize the union without an opportunity to do so while
being informed and understanding the consequences of waiving those
rights—that is, an understanding that the union may use their money
to fund union speech on a wide range of inherently political matters,
including speech with which they may disagree. California’s SB
866—and similar legislation in other states—stands as an obstacle to
workers’ full exercise of their First Amendment rights as articulated
in Janus. Public employees are denied the ability to obtain truthful
information about their rights after Janus from their employers, and
instead must approach union representatives with zero incentive to
provide full and accurate information. The Constitution does not permit the state and unions to bank on employees possibly being made
aware, through their own efforts, of the nature and effect of the
waiver.169 Without actual evidence that a waiver of First Amendment
rights was knowing and voluntary, the state employer cannot proceed
as if it received a valid waiver. Only through a Miranda-style disclosure can states ensure that their employees are making an informed
choice to join and subsidize public employee unions.

169. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 144 (1967).
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